I wanted to clarify some aspects concerning consumption rights and the handling of overconsumption (consumed more than planned) for myself, so here are some thoughts and questions.
1. The first question is how a workers’/worker-councils’ income is specifically determined over the course of a year.
As I understand it, there are two different ways by which my workplace/workers’ council (WC) will get credited a certain amount of consumption-rights, which it then can distribute (on its own terms) among its members: One would be to compensate the workplace according to its SB/SC-Ratio in relation to the average SB/SC in the sector (which means that higher effort would be rewarded), all of which is determined at the end of the year. The other method would be to just give every council the same average compensation per person.
Now assuming the first case: Am I correct, that the whole amount of distribution rights your workplace gets credited is set at the end of one year for the whole respective following year? Example: The average SB/SC compensation in my sector is 10.000 (PE-currency) per person. In the end of year 1 the result of my WC with 10 members is a SB/SC-Ratio of 20% above average. This means that my workplace gets 120.000 (PE-currency) to distribute among its member in the following year 2.
So far correct? Is it just about the (last) end-year results determining the following years distribution? There is no (inter-year running) monthly assessment and adaptation of the workplace compensation? What if a workplace hires a new worker, would this in the above example mean that the WC now would have 132.000 (PE) to distribute among its members, or if the new workmate joins in the middle of the year (if even possible) accordingly 126.000 (PE)?
2. Now the (widely different) second question: What if I overstretch my consumption in relation to my planning-assessment in the annual planning procedure during the year?
Both Hahnel and Anders address this question (Hahnel, Democratic Economic Planning, p. 125-126 and Anders, Anarchist Accounting, p. 42).
Both propose that if a certain degree of deviation is reached, you’ll get informed that you maybe should revise your proposal. But assuming you won’t do that and (maybe also for other reasons) at the end of the year you’ll have overconsumed in relation to your personal plan (since you are free to do so). Is there some kind of penalty-fee-mechanism which encourages the consumers to try to stick to the plan as best as possible, or otherwise to revise the plan as exactly as possible during the year?
Here a quote from ‘Democratic Economic Planning’:
“If one’s rate of consumption for an item deviates by say 20% from the rate implied by the annual request, consumers could be “prompted” and asked if they want to make a change. In any case, if at the end of the year the total social cost of someone’s actual consumption differs from the social cost of what they had asked and been approved for, they would simply be credited or debited appropriately in their savings account.” (p. 126)
One thing that irritates me here is the formulation that at the end of the year you get ‘credited or debited’. Why at the end of the year? As far as I understood it your account gets debited as soon as you buy something during the year? Is this as obvious as it seems and just means that - bottom line, as the sum of all these individual payments - you would have to pay proportionally more in comparison to your (not complied with) plan-proposal? If that is the case, where is the incentive to revise your proposal except for the (at some point probably somewhat annoying) mails urging you to do so?