How To Make Adjustments?

It seems a common point of criticism towards the model is some variation of “how would adjustments be made as the year goes on?” It seems quite easy to detect when there are deviations from the original plan by simply analyzing how many products have been picked up from the distribution center, and then comparing that to the planned supply.

However, things become more difficult when we need to coordinate an increase of supply for a certain product. Councils will need to negotiate with one another to receive user rights for additional inputs such as natural resources or intermediete goods.

I have two questions regarding this:

  1. What would one of these negotiations look like? I think it would be beneficial to lay out an example scenario to help people get a clearer picture.

  2. How could we use technology to make this process less painful? Something I really like about the annual planning procedure is that everyone submits proposals and the IFB simply analyzes that data and lets people revise. It would be nice if revisions worked in a similar way so we’re not having in person meetings between different councils or federations.

I’m imagining something like this:

  • A computer system detects a shortage for a particular product and signals the relevant worker councils responsible for making the product.

  • Each workplace that was signaled then has an opportunity to submit a proposal that basically says “we commit to producing x more of these products if we can get access to these inputs”.

  • If an input they require is an intermediete good, the computer system will signal the worker councils responsible for it so they can submit revision proposals too.

  • Once all relevant workplaces have had a chance to submit revision proposals, all federations will take a vote on which proposals should be approved to meet the demand increase. This is similar to how everyone has the right to give a thumbs up or thumbs down to production and consumption proposals during the annual planning procedure.

I’m sure I’m missing some details here, but the flow of this feels pretty good to me. What are your thoughts?

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Hi Michael

What you’ve described seems reasonable to me. My thinking is that some sort of ongoing monitoring is needed and that the IFB would be employed year round to facilitate this process.

I’m reminded of a conversation I had with our local BBQ propane gas retailer. All he does is fill tanks. He once remarked that if we had a warm spring he sold more propane gas because of a longer BBQing season. Our supply/demand intel would likely come from such sources. Depending on the type of spring other locations are having, there could be readjustments made as to managing supply in various locations. Reallocations could be made elsewhere.

In addition to a computer system monitoring shortages and surpluses, anticipating them with good intel from people good at this sort of thing would be useful.

People in business are good at this sort of thing. Encouraging entrepreneurialism in a Parecon would be vital to its success. Satisfaction for a job well done as well as praise from the community would be the reward.

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Yes, I agree this is a job for the IFB, but maybe they would need a new name since none of this has to do with “facilitating iterations” like in the main procedure haha.

I think estimating shortages could be done entirely by computers, but maybe that’s the programmer in me talking. If we keep track of each person’s consumption plan and monitor what they pick up, we can easily tell when they deviate from the plan. If there won’t be enough supply to meet the remaining consumption that’s planned, the alert could be sent. There are other ways to do this too like you mentioned.

I also agree that encouraging entrepreneurs is important. This is slightly off topic, but I think a big selling point here is that everyone is on equal ground to start their own workplace. The only prerequisite is they need to be approved for inputs via the annual planning procedure, and also request access to a building depending on how that’s set up (or if they even need one). There’s no concept of raising enough startup capital, begging rich people for money etc. That’s a really nice feature I think!

Thanks for sharing your thoughts!

I don’t know how I didn’t see this forum before. I recently created a forum to discuss post plan adjustments but since this one is already here we can just continue the conversation here. Below is what I posted in the other forum.

Michael, my post is largely in response to what you have outlined in your original message in this forum. It’s also in response to some things Robin has said in his books.

This is my take on answering the questions you raise:

I have noticed that some people propose that adjustments to the annual participatory plan to balance supply and demand will in some ways have to be negotiated between councils. For example, in Democratic Economic Planning Robin provides an example of adjustments in the shoe industry and says these negotiations would have to be “between the shoe industry federation and the national consumer federation.”

In addition, I have noticed some people think that prices should not be adjusted much throughout the year, and that price adjustments should be a last resort.

I am not sure why negotiations would need to take place or why price adjustments should be a last resort. I think price adjustments would have to change a ton throughout the year, and maybe even be updated every week or so. This is because the annual plan gives extremely rough estimates of true costs and benefits of goods and services. If we want parecon to come anywhere close to making these accurate it seems prices would have to change based on supply and demand frequently.

The thing is, if this is true, then requiring all price adjustments to be negotiated seems like it could be approaching central planning. Especially if all negotiations on the consumption side have to happen via the national consumer federation.

However, I don’t think all of this is necessary. What if adjustments happened like this:

Prices throughout the year adjust based on supply and demand frequently, say every week. If a resource from the commons that a workplace has a user permit for is in excess supply (because less people end up buying the workplace’s products that use the commons resource than was predicted by the annual plan), the solution could be: after the resource, say a plot of land used to produce lumber for a workplace that produces chairs, has sat idle long enough, say one month to keep things simple, the workplace must put it back into the commons so others can use it if needed.

Now other workplaces that need the lumber, say a workplace that produces wooden cabinets, could get a user permit for the land. This is assuming they are experiencing more demand for their cabinets than was predicted during the annual plan.

The following question arises: would the workplace that produces cabinets need to “pay” for the user permit for the plot of land in the sense that their is a price for the user permit that gets added to their social cost? I think the answer is yes, so how do you arrive at this price?

I think that instead of having negotiations or having ad hoc instances of planning where all councils that are affected have to submit proposals (which is something I have heard suggested before), you could have the following system to achieve prices that accurately reflect the social cost of the land:

When the chair maker puts the land back into the commons a “bidding period” takes place. In this period that lasts say two weeks for all resources to keep things simple, all workplaces that want access to the land submit bids to get it. To get a clearer picture of how this could work: resources that are available in the commons could be listed on a site like Ebay. Producers would place bids and whoever wins at the end of the bidding period would get access to the resource for the final bid price. (And note that they would get the resource until the end of the year because at that time all resources are available to all workplaces in annual planning). Now, the winning workplace does not pay for the resource with their income; the price just gets added to their social cost.

Another question arises: Does the chair maker get back any of the social cost (SC) that they paid to get access to the plot of land at the beginning of the year (in other words, does their SC decrease since they gave up the resource)? Yes, it could work in the following way: say the cost, in terms of SC, was 100 at the beginning of the year to get access to the land, and the chair-maker put the resource back in the commons at the end of March. There are twelve months in a year, and March is the third month, so the chair maker would have a social cost for the plot of land for the year of 3/12 X 100 = 25. In other words, they would only “pay” the social cost of the resource for the time period in which they had access to it. (Note that I am simplifying, the society would likely want to make the calculations more specific by performing them in terms of days, say 90 days/365 X 100, rather than in terms of months).

I have been explaining how price adjustments could be made when their is excess supply, but by doing so I inadvertently explained what would happen in the case of excess demand, which is the case for the cabinet maker. The cabinet maker would place bids for the plot of land hoping to get it as to increase production. And if they cannot get access to any land to increase production that is okay. This is because if there is not lumber producing land available to them it means that other workplaces are using this type of land for socially beneficial purposes – because if these other workplaces weren’t using the land for social beneficial purposes (i.e., having their products that use the wood actually sell), then they would have been required to put the land back into the commons after a month (just like the chair maker had to). Robin suggests this in Democratic Economic Planning when he says, “The case of excess demand is more complicated. To raise shoe production, more resources will have to be drawn away from industries experiencing excess supply.” This implies that if workplaces are not experiencing excess supply to give to other workplaces, then the former must be using the resources in a socially beneficial way.


Another issue I want to address is the idea I have heard from people suggesting that adjusting the annual plan might be unfair to consumers in some cases. For example, if I put in my consumption proposal that I wanted 8 shirts throughout the year at 10 credits apiece, and then demand for the shirts goes far beyond what was in the plan making the shirts 20 credits, I am now sort of screwed over. Afterall, it isn’t my fault that demand for shirts went up so much.

I don’t think this is a serious issue. To me, the annual plan is something everyone does as their social responsibility to get the year started off on the right foot. It is not a promise that they will get all the goods and services they requested at the prices that the plan settled on. If they wanted it to be a promise then they would need to support making all consumers buy exactly what they put into their consumption proposals with no variation.

So, since the economy would be self-managed, you allow them to make this decision in a fair way. If they decide they don’t want this, and instead decide they want people to have the freedom to change their minds about consumption preferences throughout the year, then they have just agreed to the condition that they may not get everything they wanted in the consumption proposal at the prices settled on during the plan. In other words, the society has agreed, in a self-managed way, that they prefer efficiency over certainty.

They are therefore responsible for that choice and it is not unfair if demand goes up and they have to pay more than they wanted for something they had in their proposal, even though their demand (e.g., the amount of shirts they were going to buy) did not increase.


I want to also just note that it seems to me that adjusting the annual plan is just as important, if not more important, than the plan itself. If adjustments to prices and quantities of various things are occurring a lot, as it seems to me they would have to be, then adjusting plays a huge role in parecon.

Because of this, I think that it is important when explaining the system that we explain how adjustments would be made. The criticism I have noticed that some leftists have of parecon is that they don’t believe doing one plan at the beginning of the year could be detailed enough. This is based on a misunderstanding of parecon though as adjustments would be made throughout the year to refine the plan.

Explaining these adjustments to these leftists could get them to support it I think. Additionally, it is a good way to explain it to leftists who are sympathetic to some form of market socialism as the adjustment procedure is more “market-y” than annual planning.

In fact, I think we should develop a way to explain parecon by explaining it first in terms of adjustments. We would explain the system in terms of how it would be functioning throughout the year, and then after doing that add on that there would also be a annual participatory planning procedure that would help the year get started on the right foot. Having two different types of explanations would allow the message to resonate with a more diverse group of people I think.

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That’s ok, thanks for contributing to the discussion!

The prices are used as a guide to help people plan their economic activities. Once we have the activities planned, the prices have served their purpose. We just need to do what was agreed upon to get the outcomes we desire. There’s no reason to keep adjusting prices at this point unless we know an adjustment is needed. Identifying that something needs to change is the first step to making adjustments. Otherwise, we’re adjusting prices for no reason and potentially causing adjustments to occur that aren’t really needed.

Also, the prices will always be rough estimates, even if you adjusted them every week.

I think we’re falling back into the same discussion we had in the other thread. What do you mean by “bidding”? To me, in the context of a participatory economy, this means a workplace commits to producing x number of outputs if they’re given access to x number of inputs.

However, when you start talking about Ebay, offering prices to get access to inputs, and all this other stuff… what you’re proposing here is a market.

If we treat bidding like we do during the annual planning procedure, then what you’re proposing boils down to running a planning procedure multiple times throughout the year.

I made this comment when talking about possible scenarios where we’re unable to increase supply to meet demand. In this scenario you would either have to A) increase the price dramatically to cut off demand or B) start rationing products. In this scenario, I would prefer a rationing system where the people who asked for the product in their consumption plan are given first dibs.

I think parecon did need a mechanism to make price changes more flexible. A large part of the reason that planned economy ultimately failed was because people’s needs were changing, while planned economy could not keep up with changes.

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I just think that adjustments will have to occur very frequently and so what my proposal does is attempt to streamline this process while preserving all of the values of a participatory society. I believe the prices will have to adjust if we want to get anywhere close to estimating true social costs and benefits through prices.

I agree with you that prices will always be estimates. It’s just that I think prices arrived at through participatory planning will be extremely rough estimates. Prices arrived at with adjustments to prices arrived at in the plan throughout the year will be quite good rough estimates.

So I agree that bidding occurs during annual planning in the way you describe: “a workplace commits to producing x number of outputs if they’re given access to x number of inputs,” and through rounds of planning they adjust this bid. If multiple workplaces want the inputs, the price will keep increasing in rounds of planning via the IFB until there is only one winner. The winner gets access to the resource for the year.

What I am talking about is very similar, except workplaces are just going on a site throughout the year (note this is after annual participatory planning has already taken place) where all available inputs (productive resources from the commons) are listed. They place bids on what they want/need for production. (And if you are wondering how commons resources would become available throughout the year please see my original/first post in this forum).

For example, one workplace makes a bid for an available piece of land which can be used for lumber production of 5000 social cost units. But then a different workplace submits a bid for 6000 social cost units. The first workplace doesn’t bid again and at the end of the bidding period the latter workplace wins, so they get access to the land and 6000 social cost units are added to the social cost for their workplace.

I feel the need to keep emphasizing that they are not paying for the land with their income. The 6000 social cost units are just added to their workplace, and at the end of the year the workplace is evaluated to make sure their SB/SC ratio is at or above 1, like Robin describes would be done in a participatory economy in his books.

So, in this setup for workplaces to make adjustments throughout the year they don’t have to make a proposal for how much of a good or service they are going to produce. The consumption side of the economy does not need to be involved in these bidding procedures. There aren’t any proposals being made (unless you count the workplaces’ bids on the site as proposals). Nor is there any need for negotiations between federations on the production and consumption side, which, as I have said, seems to me to be approaching central planning if adjustments would need to be made frequently throughout the year – as I believe they do.

I’ve grown to dislike the word bid because it seems to confuse people, but I am not sure of another word. This is the Google definition of bid: “offer (a certain price) for something…” This is indeed how I am using the word. There is nothing in the definition that says that all bidding must happen through markets. It’s a more general term than that.

I want to address why I don’t see my proposal as a market. Here is Chat-GPT’s definition of a market:

“a “market” refers to the arrangement or environment in which buyers and sellers interact to exchange goods, services, or resources.”

If I had one of Robin’s books on me I would see how he defines it too, but I am pretty sure he at least says there needs to be a buyer and seller for a market transaction to occur, like is stated in the Chat-GPT definition.

So in markets their are buyers and sellers. In what I have proposed there is no seller. Resources from the commons become available and workplaces bid on them. When the workplace wins a bid, its cost gets added to the workplace’s SC. There is no seller that gets to take the social cost units the workplace has just “paid” and use those social cost units.

By the way, I used Ebay as an example literally just so people could visualize a site that producers could go on where there are available resources/inputs listed for them to bid on. The actual process is much different than Ebay of course because Ebay is a market. On Ebay there is clearly a buyer and a seller. Using Ebay as an example maybe wasn’t the best choice, so sorry about that.

So I prefer choice A because to me consumers are not promised that they will get what they have planned to buy in their annual proposals. They are also not promised they will get to buy those goods and services at the prices settled on in the plan. To me, consumers are required to submit their proposals simply because it is their social responsibility.

But at the same time, I guess this is really one of those “edge issues.” If a participatory society wants to have choice B to some extent, then that is their choice and the economy is still a participatory economy. However, if they were to choose not to increase prices at all throughout the year in every single situation like this, I think they would not have a participatory economy anymore because the economy would not live up to the value of efficiency. Where the exact line is that would determine if an economy is efficient enough to be considered parecon I of course don’t know.

Thank you for always engaging with my posts Michael! You provide good insights and get me thinking.


I want to note one more thing. In my original post I said that workplaces that are not using a resource from the commons for a specific period of time (I used a month as an example) would be required to surrender their user permit for the resource and make it available for other workplaces to bid on in order to use.

But this requirement shouldn’t even be necessary because workplaces would have an incentive to surrender user permits for resources they are not using. This is because, as I mentioned in my original post, they would get back some of the social cost they “paid” to get access to the resource at the beginning of the year. I go through the calculations of how much they would get back in the original post.

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I don’t think introducing market logic preserves the values of a participatory society. You seem to be assuming that all planning procedures are cumbersome and incapable of adapting quickly. I understand why you’re concerned (like Free said, this was a core failure of centrally planned economies), but I think it’s possible to come up with procedures that are capable of adapting quickly… I don’t see any reason why the one I proposed in the other thread would be sluggish, but it’s hard to know for sure until we try it in real life.

The accuracy of a price doesn’t become better or worse just because you’re calculating it more often. Prices are just a tool for simplifying communication between the various actors, that’s it. In a democratically planned economy, moving prices up and down each week doesn’t cause anything to happen, it’s the decision making underneath that’s important. We use prices to help guide the decision making process when it’s time to make decisions.

Similar to your proposal in the other thread, what you’re proposing gives complete power to the producers to do whatever they want as long as they’re willing to add their 100% made up price to their yearly social costs. You keep talking about calculating accurate prices, but here you’re proposing that the workplaces can come up with whatever price points they want and then add that to their benefit cost ratios.

It’s just like we talked about on the other thread… I know you don’t want to call this market logic, but just like in a market, you’ve opened up a can of worms for price manipulation and inefficient allocation of resources.

Also, we want to give input access to people who have a HIGHER benefit cost ratio. In your example, the higher bidder is actually more inefficient, so none of this makes any sense really.

Let’s say the social benefit of land is 10000. The first bidder would have a benefit cost ratio of 2 (10000 / 5000), the second would have a ratio of 1.67 (10000 / 6000). So really, you’d want to be bidding down. If I was a producer I’d just bid 1 for everything! :stuck_out_tongue:

In a participatory economy, the key idea is that the commons belong to everyone, so both producers and consumers should play a role in determining how they’re used. To make this happen during plan adjustments, you would need to either incorporate their sales data (what I prefer) or allow the councils to be active somehow during the adjustments.

Bidding, using the definition you like, is exactly what makes a market a market. At one point, this website defined markets as a “competitive bidding between buyers and sellers which determines what is produced and consumed.” And that’s exactly what they are.

The seller in your example is everyone in society who collectively owns and manages the commons, and you’re proposing that the producers can do whatever they want with it as long as they can come up with an arbitrary price that’s within a certain range so it looks good on their benefit cost ratio.

Thanks, and you’re welcome :stuck_out_tongue: I’ve enjoyed chatting with you and thinking through all of this stuff, but I think we’ve come to a point where we’ll have to agree to disagree on some things. :slight_smile:

I have responses, but if you want to just agree to disagree at this point that is okay with me. I do want to respond to the following though just for clarification purposes:

Of course workplaces would want to bid low to get access to resources. But if one workplace bids 6000 (like in the example), they will outbid the other workplace who only bid 5000. The workplace that bid 6000 receives the resource and the other does not. (And note that the latter workplace does not end up getting the 5000 units of social cost added to their SB/SC ratio. I mean, they lost the bid and don’t receive the resource so it would make no sense to “charge” them.)

Okay, but what if I bid 2? Then I will get the resource if you don’t bid higher than 2.

Also, why stop at 1 in your example? If no one has placed a bid on a resource why not make yours 0? Then, if no one else bids you will get access to the resource for free. And note that this is not a bad thing. If you get it for 0 it means that no other workplace needs the resource and therefore there is no social cost of you using it. So it is efficient and sensible for the society to let you use it for free. Otherwise it would just be sitting idle.

And to address another of your points: the resource would go to the workplace with the highest social benefit to social cost ratio in what I am proposing. Having a higher SB/SC ratio basically gives a workplace more room to bid higher. This is because the workplaces need to place bids within their price range in order to make sure their SB/SC ratio is at or above one for the year, which will be evaluated at the end of the year – just like Robin has said in his books. In the example, the workplace that bid 5000 would of course like to bid more than 6000 because then they would get the resource, but they can’t because their social benefit (and therefore their SB/SC ratio) is not high enough.

I hope some of this illustrates why workplaces can’t just “come up with whatever price points they want and then add that to their benefit cost ratios.” I mean, they can bid whatever they want but that won’t get them far. Like I have said, if you bid 1 for everything I will just bid 2. So you will have to raise your bid or not get any resources (except the ones you already have from annual participatory planning).

Let’s imagine an economy with two workplaces, two types of products, and the following numbers:

Bread
Social Benefit: 20

Workplace A’s Social Cost: 10
Workplace B’s Social Cost: 40

Workplace’s A’s Benefit Cost Ratio: 2 (20 / 10)
Workplace’s B’s Benefit Cost Ratio: .5 (20 / 40)

Cellphone
Social Benefit: 20

Workplace A’s Social Cost: 40
Workplace B’s Social Cost: 10

Workplace’s A’s Benefit Cost Ratio: .5 (20 / 40)
Workplace’s B’s Benefit Cost Ratio: 2 (20 / 10)

Workplace A’s Production Plan
Bread: 200 units
Cellphone: 0 units
Total Benefit Cost Ratio: 2 (4000 / 2000)
Maximum Bid During Adjustments: 2000 (since 4000 / (2000 + 2000) = 1)

Workplace B’s Production Plan
Bread: 0 units
Cellphone: 100 units
Total Benefit Cost Ratio: 2 (2000 / 1000)
Maximum Bid During Adjustments: 1000 (since 2000 / (1000 + 1000) = 1)

These numbers are the result of the annual planning procedure, and both production plans have been approved. Note that workplace A produces bread efficiently, but produces cellphones inefficiently. The opposite is true of Workplace B.

Now, the plan has started and we can begin using your proposal to make plan adjustments.

Workplace B decides they want to produce 500 more cellphones, so they decide to use their maximum bid of 1000 to use 2x the inputs they actually need to make the 500 cellphones.

Let’s stop for a moment and notice two major problems. 1) In reality, the social cost of doing this is 10000 ((500 x 10) * 2), but since they can come up with whatever price they want, the bid makes it look like the social cost is 1000. 2) Since they don’t have to submit proposals for what they’re doing with the inputs, they can bid on however many inputs they want, and do whatever they want with them.

Now, Workplace A decides to produce 1000 cellphones. They decide to bid on the same number of inputs as Workplace B, but since they were approved to produce more bread they have a higher benefit cost ratio to work with. Therefore, they use their maximum bid of 2000.

Since Workplace A made the higher bid, they get access to the inputs, even though by all accounts they’re the more inefficient workplace. They go ahead and make the 1000 cellphones.

Later on, we find out that society only wanted to consume 200 cellphones… but since Workplace A can do whatever they want with the inputs, there was no way to reduce overproduction or to ensure they were doing things that were actually beneficial to society.

At this point man, these are my final words on the subject. I stand by everything I’ve previously said, and I hope running the numbers helps you and others gain a better understanding of why things work the way they do in the annual planning procedure.

All the best,

Michael